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Introduction
The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is necessarily an uneasy compromise.
If the LOAC prohibited everything necessary to the effective conduct of
warfare, it would simply be ignored and would quickly fall into disuse. On
the other hand, if it allowed whatever most contributes to victory, it would
be pointless and would add nothing to good strategy. At either extreme,
excessive stringency or excessive permissiveness, the LOAC would fail to
accomplish its goal of limiting war while permitting conduct that contrib-
utes to victory. In this uneasy compromise some find the genius of the
LOAC; others find its disgrace. We will not address here whether the
LOAC overall is too stringent or too permissive.' Instead, we will focus on
one particular, but crucial, issue on which the LOAC is sometimes given an
interpretation permissive enough to defeat one of its essential purposes.
Specifically, the provisions of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 2 per-
taining to attacks on military objectives are sometimes read in a way that
* The authors would like to thank Ward Thomas of Holy Cross College, Steven
Ratner of the University of Texas School of Law, and Nicholas J. Wheeler of the
University of Wales for valuable suggestions and for access to their important
forthcoming works on these and related topics.
f Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations,
Oxford University.
T Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. This is briefly discussed in Henry Shue, War in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRAC-
TICAL ETHICS 734-61(Hugh LaFollette ed., 2003). For a more in depth discussion, see
generally AJ. COATES, THE ETHICS OF WAR (1997); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST
WARS (3d ed., 2000).
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7,
1978) [hereinafter Protocol I].
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undermines what is arguably the single most significant principle for the
conduct of war-the principle of discrimination. 3 The thesis of this article
is that a less permissive reading better maintains the coherence of the
LOAC as a whole. 4
The principle of discrimination is the most important restriction on
damage to civilians and civilian property during warfare. A central expres-
sion of the principle of discrimination in Protocol I appears in Article
51(4), which provides that: "[i]ndiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indis-
criminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military
objective; ... and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction."
This principle of discrimination is supplemented by an additional but elu-
sive principle of proportionality. Article 51(5)(b), which pertains to indis-
criminate attacks, and Article 57(2)(b), which pertains to required
precautions in attack, state that even attacks directed at specific military
objectives are impermissible if they "may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a com-
bination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated."
A decision-maker considering the legality of attacking a particular tar-
get must therefore consider first whether the target is a military objective,
and second, whether an attack on that target, even if it is a military objec-
tive, will be proportionate. Our argument is that, as currently interpreted,
the law applicable to these decisions unduly favors military efficiency over
protection of the civilian population when the object in question can simul-
taneously serve military and civilian functions. We first examine the defi-
nition of a military objective, and then look at the proportionality calculus.
I. Defining Military Objectives
Protocol I largely separates its discussion of attacks upon persons from its
discussion of attacks upon objects. Articles 50 and 51 define and prohibit
attacks upon "civilians" and the "civilian population. '5 Article 51 also
contains a two-step expression of the general principle that attacks are
only permissible on military objectives. First, indiscriminate attacks are
prohibited, and second, attacks not directed at specific military objectives
are defined as indiscriminate. Article 52(2) specifies which objects are
"military objectives." After repeating the prohibition against attacks on
3. See Protocol I, supra note 2. As of November 1, 2002, 159 states were party to
the Protocol.
4. For a splendid overview of the cluster of issues about civilian infrastructure, of
which the issue discussed here is a member, see Ward Thomas, Going Downtown: Civil-
ian Infrastructure as a Target in Air Campaigns, Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association (Aug. 30, 2002) (on file with authors).
5. These Articles are found in Part IV, Chapter II, of the Protocol which contains
the provisions for the protection of "civilians and civilian population." See Protocol I,
supra note 2, at arts. 50-51.
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anything not fitting the definition of a "military objective," Article 52(2)
provides the crucial definition:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
The definition of military objective in Article 52(2) consists of two
parts. The first part limits military objectives to objects making an effective
contribution to military action. The second part introduces a further
restriction that applies even to objects that satisfy the first part of the defi-
nition. We simply want to note the significance of the further restriction
before turning our attention to the first part of the definition. What we are
calling the second part of Article 52(2) is the following portion: "and
whose total or partial. destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circum-
stances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage." This lan-
guage establishes an additional requirement of situational relevance. Even
an object that makes an effective contribution to military action may never-
theless fail to qualify as a military objective if, in the specific situation, its
"destruction, capture or neutralization" would not offer a definite military
advantage. In other words, even objects with the general characteristics of
a military objective do not qualify to be attacked if, in the concrete circum-
stances holding then and there, destroying them would provide no "defi-
nite military advantage."
For example, a heavy bridge that would enable tanks to cross into a
combat area on the other side of a river would generally qualify as a mili-
tary objective under the first part of the paragraph. However, if in fact no
combat is occurring or is likely to occur in the area to which the bridge
leads, then the bridge may not be destroyed simply because it is the kind of
object whose destruction could hypothetically be militarily advantageous.
To be a military objective under Protocol I, it must be the case that its
destruction would provide a definite military advantage in the actual cir-
cumstances. Further, the military advantage must be real, not merely theo-
retical. Otherwise, an adversary force could simply range around a
country destroying all its bridges and thus wreaking indiscriminate
destruction upon civilian objects. We recognize that this additional
requirement of situational relevance significantly restricts the range of
objects that may permissibly be attacked. 6 In this article, however, we
6. The additional restriction is significant enough to have aroused opposition from
within the U.S. Air Force. See Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Facade: A Critical Look
at the Current Law on Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 A.F. L.
REV. 143 (2001). Major Meyer argues that the second requirement in Protocol I art.
52(2) would, if it had been authoritative during World War II, have prohibited the Allied
bombing at Pas de Calais as a ruse to divert defensive forces from Normandy prior to
the Allied landing there. See id. at 169-70. Major Meyer reasons that the bombing at
Calais produced "little immediate military advantage" in the sense required by "restric-
tive" interpretations of Article 52(2) since the actual landing was at Normandy. Id.
While line-drawing problems will always arise in such cases, it seems clear that the fore-
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restrict ourselves to issues about the permissiveness of the general defini-
tion in the first part of paragraph 52(2).
Article 52(1) states that: "[c]ivilian objects shall not be the object of
attack or of reprisals." The object of attack is the target or what is aimed at
as distinguished from what is in fact struck, which may of course be differ-
ent. The "object of attack" refers to what in moral terminology would be
stated in terms of "intention." Civilian objects shall not be intentionally
attacked, one ought not to intend to destroy or damage them (moral
requirement), and one shall not aim at them, that is make them "the object
of attack or of reprisals" (legal requirement). 7 The legal requirement does
not, perhaps, fully make sense unless one tacitly presupposes the moral
requirement. Why does it matter what is the object of attack? Because the
choice of the object is the expression of what one intends to destroy or
damage, and it is of great (moral) significance what one does intentionally
and what one does unintentionally.
In any case, the primary difficulty arises with regard to "dual-use"
facilities. "Dual-use" refers not simply to two uses, but to two kinds of
uses, namely civilian and military. The difficult cases arise when the two
kinds of uses are simultaneous rather than alternative; in other words not
when a facility sometimes serves civilian purposes and sometimes serves
military purposes, but rather when it continuously serves both civilian
purposes and military purposes. While the label "dual-use" is relatively
recent, objects and facilities meeting this definition have always existed.
For example, a bridge that is capable of allowing a farmer to truck produce
across a river to the market and that is also capable of allowing a tank to
cross is a dual-use object. One use is civilian (products to market) and. one
use is military (tanks to battle). Currently the label "dual-use" is primarily
applied to essential infrastructure such as electricity-generating installa-
tions and oil-refining facilities that simultaneously serve civilian and mili-
tary purposes.
Protocol I does not use the term "dual-use" or refer explicitly to dual-
purpose facilities or objects. However, the definition of military objective
in the first part of Article 52(2) can be read to classify every dual-use facil-
ity as a potential military objective. This reading is the object of our con-
cern, because it is extraordinarily permissive in the bombing that it allows.
According to this permissive reading of Article 52(2), if an object by virtue
of its "nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action," and its destruction under the circumstances "offers a defi-
nite military advantage," then the object becomes a legitimate military
objective. No attention need be paid to that object's contribution to civilian
life. Strictly speaking, its civilian function does not figure into whether the
seeable military advantage of bombing at Calais was the reduction in the forces posi-
tioned at Normandy and that Article 52(2) would, if it had been in force, have been fully
satisfied. See MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 325
(1982).
7. Attacks in reprisal are a special case which this Article does not address.
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object is a "military objective."8 Whatever contribution the facility makes
to civilian life drops out of the equation, subject only to application of the
principle of proportionality.
The difficulties in the position embodied in Article 52(2) come out
most clearly when we compare one dual-use facility with a pair of separate
facilities. For example, consider two different wars, one against adversary
Able and the other against adversary Baker. Able has a pair of electricity-
generating plants: a coal-burning plant that exclusively serves civilian pur-
poses and an oil-burning plant that exclusively serves military purposes.
Neither of Able's generators is a dual-purpose facility: the coal-fired plant is
strictly civilian, and the oil-fired plant is strictly military. The coal-fired
plant cannot be considered a military objective, and thus making it the
object of an attack would be committing an indiscriminate attack upon a
civilian object. The oil-fired plant is a military objective (assuming that its
destruction would offer a definite military advantage in the actual circum-
stances), so it is a lawful target. However, suppose that the pair of facilities
in Able are immediately next .to each other, so that any munitions that
normally would be used in order to have a sufficiently high probability of
destroying the military objective (oil-fired plant) would foreseeably inca-
pacitate the civilian object (coal-fired plant) as well.
Under these circumstances, provided that only the oil-fired plant serv-
ing the military was the object of attack-and the intention was to destroy
the military facility and not to destroy the civilian facility-then an attack
on the oil-fired plant could be a discriminate attack even if the coal-fired
plant was also destroyed. However, the justification of any attack as "dis-
criminate" involves at least two steps. The first step, as discussed above,
involves the inquiry as to what in the morality of war would be called
"intention"; in legal terms, were all the objects of the attack military objec-
tives?9 The second step concerns what in the morality of war is called
"proportionality," which in Protocol I is expressed in terms of excessive
incidental loss. If Able's civilian. facility was not an "object of the attack,"
then. damage to the civilian facility is "incidental." Incidental damage is
what is more popularly referred to as "collateral damage," although Proto-
col I does not use this terminology. Some incidental ("collateral") damage
is permitted, but not without limit. The second step involves an examina-
tion of whether the incidental damage which may be expected from the
attack is excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated.
8. A previous article called for revision of Article 52(2), but mistakenly assumed
that this permissive reading of Article 52(2) was correct; revision of the text was there-
fore necessary. See Henry Shue, Bombing to Rescue? NATO's 1999 Bombing of Serbia, in
ETHICS AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION (Deen K. Chatterjee & Don E. Scheid eds., forthcom-
ing July 2003). Other authors endorse the call for revision of Article 52(2). See Nicholas
J. Wheeler, The Kosovo Bombing Campaign: The Limits of Civilian Protection in Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Paul Keal & Christian
Reus-Smit eds., forthcoming).
9. As already indicated, this first step itself has two parts, embodied in the two
parts of the definition of military objective in Article 52(2). See Protocol I, supra note 2.
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II. The Proportionality Calculus
Considerable doubt exists concerning how precise or demanding the test
of anticipated excessive incidental loss is.10 Nevertheless, in spite of the
fact that the civilian plant is not an object of attack-that is, the civilian
plant is not damaged intentionally-the damage to it must be taken into
account. That damage may indeed be incidental or unintentional, but it is
still real damage. Under LOAC all damage-at least all direct damagel I-is
significant, though intentional damage carries greater significance than
unintentional damage. If the damage to the civilian facility were inten-
tional, the attack would be straightforwardly prohibited because it is
impermissible to target an object that is not a military objective. But even
incidental civilian damage should not be excessive, so the magnitude of the
expected incidental civilian loss comes into the overall judgment of
whether the attack is permissible. Therefore, Able's military facility (oil-
burning plant) may be attacked only if the expected incidental damage to
its civilian facility (coal-burning plant) is not excessive.
In the case of Able's civilian facility, the immediate costs of any direct
damage to the facility are visible and easy to ascertain. Thus military plan-
ners can be expected to take them into account when deciding whether to
attack Able's military facility. By contrast, the indirect costs stemming
from the long-term effects of the plant's destruction, as they ripple through
the civilian society, are less visible and more difficult to ascertain and so
are often ignored. 12
Next consider adversary Baker, which has only the one dual-use elec-
tricity-generating facility: a gas-burning plant that serves both civilian and
military purposes. Obviously, the premise of our comparison between
Able and Baker is that from any commonsense point of view Baker's single
facility is essentially Able's two facilities under one roof. Notice, however,
what the difference between a single dual-use facility and a pair of single-
use facilities makes in the legal analysis. The first question once again, as
in the case of Able, is whether the Baker dual-use facility is a military objec-
tive that may permissibly be attacked. Plainly it is, because the gas-fired
plant, ex hypothesi, makes an effective contribution to military action and
its destruction under the circumstances offers a definite military advan-
tage. The plant also makes a contribution to civilian life, but according to
the permissive reading of Article 52(2), the concurrent civilian contribu-
tion is irrelevant to the inquiry as to whether the facility is a military
10. See, e.g., Shue, supra note 4, at 734, 747-52 (discussing the excessiveness test in
its moral guise as a proportionality test).
11. By direct damage, we mean the harm caused as the immediate result of an attack
(e.g., the collapse of a building hit by a bomb); by indirect damage (sometimes called
"reverberating effects"), we mean harm that occurs after an attack but as a foreseeable
result of it (e.g., the effects of the loss of electrical power to hospitals, sewage treatment
faculties, etc., following the destruction of a power plant). See supra text accompanying
notes 19-27 infra.
12. See id.
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objective. 13
Theoretically, the second test, which concerns whether the damage to
the civilian facility may be expected to be excessive, would still remain to
be conducted, as it was in the case of Able. However, in the case of Baker
where is the civilian facility that could suffer excessive incidental damage?
The gas-burning plant, because it makes a military contribution, and in
spite of its civilian contribution, has already been classified as a military
objective. It is the only plant there is in Baker. When it is attacked, where
is there any civilian object that is incidentally damaged, excessively or not?
What is destroyed is the gas-burning electricity-generating plant, and this
plant is a military objective. Only this plant is destroyed, so there is no
direct incidental damage to be assessed for excessiveness. 1.4
Now, we think one could reasonably argue that the idea just
expressed-that there is only one object, that it is a military objective and
so there is no civilian object that could suffer incidental damage-is con-
trary to common sense and would be legalistic in the worst sense. The
plant's destruction made its performance of a civilian function impossible.
Even if the object in question is indeed properly classified as a military
objective, the loss of the civilian function also performed by that object
cannot be allowed to disappear from all calculations as if it had never been
performed. The civilians in Baker are as affected by the loss of their dual-
use facility as the civilians in Able were from the loss of their single-use
facility.
Indeed, state practice suggests that governments are uncomfortable
with the notion that the civilian function of a dual-use facility can be
ignored. For example, in its attacks on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's
electrical power facilities, NATO forces sometimes used special carbon-
graphite filaments designed to disrupt power temporarily, in part to mini-
mize long-term incidental harm to civilians. 15 Similarly, in the Gulf War
13. See, e.g., Fran~oise J. Hampson, Means and Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in
the Gulf, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 89, 98-100
(Peter Rowe ed., 1993) (arguing that "[i]f it is assumed that power supplies are military
objectives then, by definition, they are not civilian objects"); Christopher Greenwood,
Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf Conflict, in
THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 63, 73 (Peter Rowe ed.,
1993) (arguing that if "an object is a military objective, it may be attacked.... while if it
is a civilian object it may not be attacked. There is no intermediate category of 'dual-use'
objects: either something is a military objective or it is not").
14. Of course, the risk of incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects in the
vicinity of the plant would have to be taken into account, but under this reading harm to
the plant itself is irrelevant. Whether indirect incidental harm must be taken into
account is considered below.
15. See Randy W. Stone, Comment, Protecting Civilians During Operation Allied
Force: The Enduring Importance of the Proportional Response and NATO's Use of Armed
Force in Kosovo, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 501, 528-29 (2001); see also James A. Burger, Inter-
national Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis: Lessons Learned or to be Learned, INT'L
REV. RED CROSS No. 837, at 129, 134 (2000) (arguing that "[iun the Kosovo air campaign,
in acknowledgement of the limited political objectives, an effort was made to distinguish
as much as possible the military from the civilian aspects of these dual use targets.
Planners endeavored to strike targets in such a way that the military purpose for their
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coalition forces took steps to limit the indirect consequences to civilians of
attacks on dual-use power facilities. One such step was taken by "adopting
a policy of attacking switching stations rather than generating stations, to
enable repair of the electricity system after the war."'16
But for the most part relatively little attention is paid to the long-term,
indirect harm to civilians from attacks on dual-use facilities and infrastruc-
ture. As Christopher Greenwood notes, "[a]t the time that Protocol I was
drafted, the main concern was to minimize the civilian casualties and dam-
age to civilian objects occurring during attacks, for example those killed by
the explosion of a bomb or the collapse of a building which had been
hit."t 7 Accordingly, during the Gulf War coalition forces took "great pains
... to minimize this kind of collateral damage."' 8 Similarly, the United
States and its allies took great care to minimize direct collateral damage
during the Kosovo conflict.
While the United States and its coalition partners made some effort to
limit the indirect "reverberating effects" on civilians of attacks on power
facilities and other economic infrastructure during those conflicts, U.S.
military planners do not appear to view such efforts as legally required. As
Matthew Waxman observed in a Rand study prepared for the U.S. Air
Force:
Some disagreement exists with respect to how to calculate adverse civilian
effects of attacks on military targets. One view holds that planners must
consider the long-term, indirect effects of attacks on a civilian population,
whereas the U.S. military adheres to a narrower interpretation emphasizing
direct civilian injuries or deaths. During operational planning, when target
lists are reviewed for compliance with international law, much greater
emphasis is typically given to immediate and direct collateral effects. 19
attack would be obtained while minimizing, as far as practicable, the impact on the
civilian nature of the target").
16. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 45 (1996). Most of the actors involved
in the Gulf War were not party to Additional Protocol 1, though most of them acknowl-
edge the customary law nature of some aspects of the Protocol, including the prohibi-
tion on attacks that would cause clearly disproportionate civilian casualties. See Judith
Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 391,
407-08 (1993).
17. Greenwood, supra note 13, at 79 (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. Matthew C. Waxman, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF URBAN AIR OPERA-
TIONS 21 n. 44 (2000). See also J.W. Crawford, 111, The Law of Noncombatant Immunity
and the Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 101,
106 (1997) (noting that "lhlumanitarians argue that the focus of the U.S. military on
direct injury or death as the exclusive calculus for collateral casualties is a reflection of
short-sighted thinking"); Lt. Col. Kenneth R. Rizer, Bombing Dual-Use Targets: Legal, Ethi-
cal, and Doctrinal Perspectives (2001), available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/
airchronicles/cc/Rizer.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003) (arguing that "Itlhe Air Force per-
spective on non-combatant immunity for such dual-use targets is that since the targets
are military, the US is responsible for minimizing the direct collateral damage of nearby
civilian persons and property. This doesn't preclude the Air Force from taking a liberal
interpretation of weapon-selection duties that permit high levels of force protection, nor
does the Air Force consider the long-term, indirect effects of such attacks when it applies
proportionality to the expected military gain").
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While the United States is sensitive to the political and humanitarian
costs of the destruction of power plants and other infrastructure, U.S. mili-
tary doctrine places great importance on the use of infrastructure attacks
to disrupt an enemy's command and control capabilities, air defenses, and
weapons production. In addition, many U.S. military planners also see an
advantage to placing pressure on an enemy's civilian population. Attacks
against economic infrastructure enable the attacker to "bypass the enemy's
fielded military forces by influencing the enemy populace and its leader-
ship's decisionmaking."20 In the Gulf War, for example, "to some degree
civilian deprivations were intended as part of the overall air strategy to
compel the regime's capitulation."'2 1 Accordingly, concerns over the indi-
rect, long-term harms to the civilian population of the destruction of Iraqi
infrastructure played only a modest role in Gulf War military planning, as
evidenced by the extent of the damage to Iraqi infrastructure caused by
coalition bombing.22 The same was true in the Kosovo conflict. While
NATO forces gave "special consideration-especially with regard to the
question of proportionality" to decisions involving attacks on power plants
and oil depots,23 such considerations seem to have had relatively little
effect on target selection.
Michael Schmitt suggests that recent technological improvements in
the targeting capabilities of modern weaponry may in the future draw
increasing attention to the "reverberating effects" of attacks on dual-use
facilities:
If first-tier collateral damage and incidental injury (i.e., damage and injury
directly caused by the kinetic force of the attack) become rarer, it is probable
that humanitarian attention will increasingly dwell on subsequent-tier, or
reverberating, effects. As an illustration, since electrical grids will be attack-
able with highly surgical strikes, proportionality analysis in future may well
center on derivative consequences, such as unintended but foreseeable
denial of power to medical facilities .... Of course, reverberating effects
were theoretically always calculated when assessing proportionality. How-
ever, it is only now that the means exist to limit dramatically direct collateral
damage and incidental injury that we are being sensitized to
reverberation. 24
But to date, military planners continue to resist incorporating such "rever-
berating effects" into their proportionality calculus. 25
The difficulty with ignoring the indirect long-term consequences to
civilians of the destruction of dual-use facilities is that such consequences
20. Waxman, supra note 19, at 22; see Rizer, supra note 19, at 7.
21. Waxman, supra note 19, at 21.
22. Commander J.W. Crawford goes so far as to say that "the United States adheres
to the view that proportionality is equivalent to a prohibition on the direct or negligent
targeting of civilians." Crawford, supra note 19, at 106.
23. Niek Biegman, Political Decision Making and Responsibility Regarding the Conduct
of Hostilities, in PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN 21ST-CENTURY WARFARE 71, 74 (2000).
24. Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 168 (1999).
25. See, e.g., Rizer, supra note 19, at 8.
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often outweigh the short-term, direct incidental harm. Attacks on power
plants that supply both military and civilian needs may result in the loss of
electricity used to purify water, treat sewage, run hospitals, and otherwise
sustain civilian life, with grave repercussions for public health. As Middle
East Watch concluded in an assessment of the coalition's attacks on Iraqi
infrastructure in the Gulf War:
[Tihe cost to the civilian population of these attacks on the electrical system
was severe. Iraq was quickly transformed from a modern, energy-dependent
society into, in the now-famous words of the Ahtissari report, a "pre-indus-
trial age." Shortages of food due to the U.N. embargo were exacerbated by
the lack of refrigeration and the impairment of Iraq's highly mechanized,
irrigation-based agriculture. The nation's electricity-dependent water-purifi-
cation and sewage-treatment facilities were crippled, creating a serious
health hazard. Hospitals and clinics were forced to meet this growing health
emergency, and to treat the war wounded, with, at most, erratic electricity
supplied by back-up generators. Vaccines and medicines requiring refrigera-
tion deteriorated and were difficult to replace. 26
By one estimate "more than 70,000 noncombatant deaths can be directly
attributed to the systematic destruction of Iraq's electrical power."2 7 In
Baghdad, where the "cascading repercussions of the systematic elimination
of electric power" were felt most acutely, the destruction of infrastructure
"resulted in the death of 30 times more civilians than did direct war
effects." 2
8
Of course, what matters for purposes of the law of armed conflict is
not the actual incidental harm to civilians but the expected incidental
harm. On this issue, opinions differ. As one U.S. government expert on
the law of war has observed, Iraqi power and water treatment plants
"remained unrepaired long after the war" because of the effects of contin-
ued UN sanctions, Saddam Hussein's refusal to accord repair of such facili-
ties a high priority, and Saddam's willingness to use the plight of Iraq's
civilian population to manipulate international public opinion on sanc-
tions.29 But even if the full extent and duration of the harm could not have
been anticipated, it seems likely that at a minimum, substantial adverse
effects should have been expected. 30 Moreover, as technologically devel-
26. Needless Deaths in the Gulf War, Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and
Violations of the Laws of War, available at www.hrw.org; see also Report to the Secretary-
General on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-Crisis Envi-
ronment, UN Doc. S/22366, at 5, 8 (1991) (noting the "near apocalyptic results" of
coalition bombing on Iraqi infrastructure, and finding that "most means of modern life
support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous").
27. Crawford, supra note 19, at 110.
28. Id. at 111.
29. W. Hays Parks, Book Review, 28 G.W. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 207, 222 (1994).
30. See, e.g., JUDITH GAIL GARDAM, NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY AS A NORM OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 152 (1993) (arguing that "[lt]o take the example of water
treatment plants, it must have been apparent that the loss of civilian life in the long term
from such an attack would be considerable. Both the civilian casualties and the military
advantage were capable of measurement"). See also Crawford, supra note 19, at 108
(noting that in the Gulf conflict, "[tlhere was a strikingly evident imbalance between the
supposed military advantage to be gained from attacking electricity and the discrimina-
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oped societies become ever more dependent on the uninterrupted function-
ing of basic infrastructure for the satisfaction of both civilian and military
needs, the problems posed by attacks on such infrastructure will only
increase.
III. Options for Evaluating Attacks on Dual-Use Facilities
How then is the overall acceptability of attacking a dual-purpose facility to
be judged? Three broad options are evident; we will call them limited pro-
portionality, enhanced proportionality, and protective proportionality.
A. Limited Proportionality
The first, and most simplistic, option is limited proportionality. Article
52(2) says that if an object makes an effective contribution to military
action, and its destruction offers a definite military advantage, it is a mili-
tary objective and that is that. Some objects that make effective contribu-
tions to military action, namely the dual-use ones, also make important
contributions to civilian life. Since Article 52(2) says nothing about the
civilian contributions, they simply are not included in the calculus. The
civilian contributions by dual-use facilities simply evaporate from the anal-
ysis once the facilities are correctly classified as military objectives, and
only direct incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects is taken into
account in making proportionality assessments.
Although this, limited proportionality option largely reflects current
U.S. practice, it has drawn significant criticism from within the U.S. mili-
tary.3 1 Even the United States Air Force's Major Meyer, who is highly criti-
cal of what she calls "current restrictive interpretations" of Article 52(2),32
draws attention to the fact that the destruction of dual-use targets may
cause pointless, long-term civilian damage. 33 Major Meyer notes that dur-
ing the Gulf War, "Coalition forces struck dual-use targets such as power
supplies, railroads, and bridges. The strikes had the desired temporary
effects, but also imposed more serious long-term effects on the civilian
population. Similarly, in Kosovo . . . the means chosen ultimately may
have caused more negative long-term effects than desired."3 4 We would
describe the civilian damage in both cases in considerably stronger terms,
but the immediate point is that Major Meyer is far from suggesting that the
incapacitation of the civilian function should simply be forgotten. Simi-
larly, Lieutenant Colonel Rizer, though he concludes that current law does
not require inclusion of long-term, indirect effects in proportionality
tion and proportionality constraints devised for the protection of noncombatant
civilians").
31. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 19, at 110.
32. Meyer, supra note 6, at 177.
33. Id. at 180-81.
34. Id. at 178. Major Meyer's proposed solution to the problem is, however, quite
different from ours, as we note later in the text.
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assessments, also states that ignoring such effects would be absurd.35
B. Enhanced Proportionality
The second option is to enlarge the scope of the conventional proportional-
ity test. In the case of a dual-use facility there is indeed only a single facil-
ity, not a pair of facilities that can be compared to each other. Yet, since
this one facility performs two kinds of functions, a military one and a civil-
ian one, it is perfectly intelligible to inquire whether the expected loss of
the civilian function would be disproportionate-or in the language of
LOAC, excessive as compared to the military advantage gained by the
thwarting of the military function. As indicated above, the present ten-
dency is to focus on the immediate collateral consequences of an attack,
such as the immediate loss of civilian life associated with the bombing of a
plant in an urban center.
However, serious consideration of the long-term effects of the loss of
the facility's civilian function could substantially alter the proportionality
calculus. While a facility's serving a civilian function as well as a military
function would never in itself prevent the facility from being designated a
military objective, the significance of the civilian function might over-
whelm the significance of the military function and make any attack upon
the facility impermissible because it could be expected to cause excessive
incidental harm to civilians. Therefore, while the object might be classified
as a military objective, any attack upon it would nevertheless be disallowed
by the excessive incidental damage expected from the thwarting of the civil-
ian function of that same object. This shift in approach to the calculation
of proportionality, which some critics of infrastructure bombing contend is
already required by Protocol 1,36 would by itself, if accepted by the major
powers, likely preclude the kind of bombing campaign carried out by coali-
tion forces in the Gulf War.
It might be objected that indirect effects are too speculative and remote
to factor into proportionality calculations. As Professor Christopher
Greenwood notes, indirect effects may be difficult to predict, and difficult
to separate from other contributing factors, such as the effect of economic
sanctions and decisions taken by the government of the state subject to
attack.37 Similarly, as Lt. Col. Rizer observes, it may be difficult to specify
temporal limits on indirect effects.38 As time passes, the effects of damage
to economic infrastructure become increasingly remote; if the damage is
not repaired, the fault may well lie with the state that has been attacked.
Such concerns may be valid in many cases, but more often than not the
effects of large-scale infrastructure attacks are clear and foreseeable. As
Professor Oscar Schachter points out, the bombing of Iraqi infrastructure
35. Rizer, supra note 19, at 8. However, Rizer also states that "requiring open-ended
consideration of indirect effects is equally troubling." Id.
36. See Crawford, supra note 19, at 106.
37. Greenwood, supra note 13, at 79.
38. Rizer, supra note 19, at 8.
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"predictably devastated civilian life."'39 Similarly, Commander Crawford
concludes that the military planner's job would not "become unduly bur-
densome merely because an additional level of .cognition is required in
order to fulfill faithfully the obligations of discrimination and proportion-
ality relative to collateral costs."'40 Accordingly, we think that the propor-
tionality principle obligates states to make at least a good faith effort to
factor indirect effects into their targeting decisions.
The protection afforded civilians by the proportionality analysis could
be enhanced further by insisting that military planners examine the cumu-
lative effects of multiple attacks on dual-use facilities. Under current prac-
tice "each target is assessed individually. '41 Although the military
advantage to 'be gained from an attack on a particular target may be
assessed with reference to the larger operation of which the attack is a
part,42 "[t]here appears to be no requirement that the cumulative effect of
attacks against targets of a similar type should also be taken into
account." 43 Thus, while the military advantage to be gained from attack-
ing any particular power station may be insignificant, since power may
simply. be rerouted from other power stations to serve military needs,
attacks on a substantial number of power stations might provide the antici-
pated military advantage necessary to justify each attack on each individ-
ual power station. Under those circumstances, it seems reasonable to
insist that the cumulative effects of such attacks on the civilian population
also be considered, since destruction of one power plant by itself might not
cause grave consequences for the civilian population, while the cumulative
effects of the destruction of numerous power plants might.
44
Nevertheless, we do not believe, in this context at least, that the appli-
cation of an indirect and cumulative effects standard of excessive inciden-
tal damage is a sufficiently rigorous test. As already mentioned above,
considerable grounds exist for general doubt about the stringency of exces-
sive damage or proportionality tests because the proportionality principle
is too vague, the values it compares are too different in content, 45 and
except in the clearest of cases, the indirect effects at issue are considered
39. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452,
466 (1991) (arguing that "[t]he enormous devastation that did result from the massive
aerial attacks suggests that the legal standards of distinction and proportionality did not
have much practical effect").
40. Crawford, supra note 19, at 115.
41. Hampson, supra note 13, at 98.
42. See, e.g., Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARZIAN LAW
IN ARMED CONFLICTS 444 (Dieter Fleck, ed. 1995).
43. Hampson, supra note 13, at 98.
44. Thus, Hampson suggests that if a change in the LOAC is needed, one option
would be to "require the likely cumulative effect on the civilian population of such
attacks against such targets [civilian infrastructure] to be taken into account." See
Hampson, supra note 13, at 100.
45. See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report
to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1257, 1271 (2000) (noting that the
comparison is "often between unlike quantities and values").
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too speculative for military planners to exclude otherwise legitimate mili-
tary targets on the grounds of proportionality. In principle any civilian
loss, however terrible, could be thought to be outweighed by an even
greater military advantage. As Commander Crawford notes "[tihe aerial
bombardment of national electric power systems has long been considered
indispensable to an effective wartime campaign."4 6 Prevailing military
doctrine emphasizes infrastructure attacks, particularly attacks on the
national power grid, as an essential means to degrade an enemy's air
defense, telecommunications, and command and control capabilities.4 7
Whether the undeniable military advantage produced by such attacks
is as great as military planners claim is a matter of debate. 48 Critics con-
clude that the tactical advantages produced by such attacks may be sub-
stantially outweighed by their catastrophic effects on the civilian
population.4 9 But herein lies the weakness of proportionality analysis; it is
principally of use in clear cases where there is relatively broad agreement
both on the extent of the military advantage and the extent of the civilian
harm at issue. Where such agreement is lacking, proportionality is
unlikely to exercise much of a constraining influence on targeting deci-
sions. Indeed, one study of the coalition's application of the principle of
proportionality in the Gulf War concluded that "the military advantage
always outweighed the civilian casualties as long as civilians were not
directly targeted and care was taken in assessing the nature of the target
and carrying out the attack itself."5 0 Similarly, as another commentator
notes with reference to the Kosovo conflict, "the reality of the situation is
that those objects which military commanders wished to attack, for
whatever reasons, were attacked. There is no evidence that the rigors of the
limitations imposed on the definition of a military objective were applied to
attacks against dual purpose objects."'5 1 While these assessments may
overstate the case, it seems clear that considerations of proportionality
played only a modest role in target selection.
However, we do not here wish to rest our position only on general
doubts about the excessive-damage standard. It is the specific nature of
some few civilian functions that force us to the conclusion that those few
civilian functions require a higher and firmer level of protection than the
general standard of excessiveness provides. Accordingly, we turn to the
third option: a reading of Protocol I that is more protective of a narrow
category of exceptionally vital civilian functions.
46. Crawford, supra note 19, at 101.
47. Id. at 108-09; see also Rizer, supra note 19, at 6-8.
48. See id. at 109-110 (noting a "paucity of empirical evidence" concerning the
advantages of such attacks in Iraq).
49. Id.
50. See Gardam, supra note 16, at 410.
51. Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The Air Campaign: Have the Provisions of Additional
Protocol I Withstood the Test?, 837 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 147, 159 (2000).
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C. Protective Proportionality
Protocol I already provides special protection for "objects indispensable to
the survival of the civilian population." The category is most clearly delin-
eated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 54, which provide:
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indis-
pensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as . . . drinking
water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific pur-
pose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or
to the adverse Party, whatever the motive.
3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such'of the objects
covered by it as are used by an adverse Party [as "sustenance solely for mem-
bers of its armed forces" or "in direct support of military action"] ... pro-
vided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken
which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate
food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.
5 2
Two points need to be made about "indispensable objects," meaning of
course, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.
First, a straightforward reading of Protocol I would apply the protection
specified in Article 54 to all indispensable objects. This reading is particu-
larly compelling in light of the exceptionally strong language of "whatever
the motive" and "in no event." This means that dual-use facilities whose
civilian functions are indispensable to the survival of the civilian popula-
tion may not be attacked, at least not "for the specific purpose of denying
their sustenance value to the civilian population," or if attacking them will
cause starvation or forced movement. Otherwise, the manifest purpose of
Article 54 would be entirely defeated by the classification of vital sources
of energy, such as electricity-generating plants, as military objectives sub-
ject to destruction.
Indeed, since Article 54(2) speaks explicitly of protecting "drinking
water installations and supplies," it can reasonably be read as literally pro-
tecting electricity-generating plants that supply the power necessary for the
purification and pumping of drinking water. "Drinking water installa-
tions" are indeed "render[ed] useless" when deprived of the source of the
electricity which they need to function. Consequently, if Article 52(2) is
read in conjunction with Article 54, attacks upon the power source for the
delivery of potable water, in other words water clean enough to drink with-
out contracting illness, are prohibited subject to the "for the specific pur-
pose" caveat in Article 54(2) quoted above.
The second point is that the caveat largely undercuts the utility of the
prohibition as applied to dual-use facilities. If a state attacks a power plant
for the purpose of interfering with an adversary's command and control
capabilities, then the attack is not "for the specific purpose of denying" the
civilian population the benefits of electrical power (including, for example,
potable water), even if the denial of such benefits will be the foreseeable
result of the attack.53 Thus, the United States and its coalition partners
52. Protocol I, supra note 2.
53. See Hampson, supra note 13, at 99.
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did not see Article 54 as a significant constraint on targeting decisions in
Iraq or Kosovo. As Crawford notes:
The United States accepts as customary international law the prohibition
against intentionally targeting drinking-water installations, foodstuffs,
crops, livestock and other objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population. However, in the case of Iraq, these crucial items were lost to the
noncombatant populace as a result of the reverberating effects of the aerial
bombardment of electricity.
5 4
Thus, as currently applied neither the proportionality principle nor the
restrictions on attacking indispensable objects provides much protection
for the civilian function of dual-use facilities.
Moreover, for reasons considered above, we think that even a propor-
tionality test that factors in indirect and cumulative effects may not provide
much protection to civilians in many cases. This leads us to conclude that,
at least in the case of attacks on dual-use facilities "indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population," the standard should be even more
stringent. One way to render the proportionality standard more stringent
would be to insist that attacks against indispensable objects, including
qualifying dual-use facilities, be treated as impermissible unless the
expected incidental civilian harm would not be excessive in relation to an
anticipated military advantage that was compelling, not simply concrete
and direct.55
Proportionality assessments require a balance between the risk to
civilians and military necessity. The inclusion of indirect and cumulative
effects favors civilians on the risk side of the equation; adoption of a "com-
pelling military advantage" standard would favor civilians on the military
necessity side. We think both may be necessary to the effective protection
of civilians from the effects of infrastructure bombing.
The United States, among others, would likely oppose any such
change. The United States has refused to ratify Protocol I in part because
of a concern that its provisions shift too much responsibility for collateral
damage from the defender to the attacker. 56 Our proposal would place an
even greater burden on the attacker by insulating an object that qualifies as
a military objective from attack unless an unusually stringent proportion-
ality test can be met. But as indicated above, any lesser standard is likely to
54. Crawford, supra note 19, at 110.
55. Alternative language is.suggested by Michael Schmitt, who notes that the propor-
tionality "standard could be heightened through adverbial supplementation, as in 'mili-
tary advantage must greatly outweigh' or 'significantly outweigh' collateral damage and
incidental injury." Schmitt, supra note 24, at 174.
56. See W.. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 49-68 (1990).
Under Article 58 of Protocol I, parties to a conflict are obligated to "endeavor to remove
the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from
the vicinity of military objectives," and to "avoid locating military objectives within or
near densely populated areas." But the provision is often violated, and defending forces
facing attack by a technologically more capable adversary obviously have an incentive to
shield their forces from attack by placing them in populated areas. The problem is com-
pounded by dual-use facilities since it is often impractical to situate them outside popu-
lated areas.
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result in too little protection for the civilian population from the conse-
quences of attacks on dual-use infrastructure.
At the same time, the standard we propose would not preclude all
attacks on essential infrastructure. 57 Such a preclusive standard would not
only be impractical-states with significant air forces would reject it out of
hand-but it would also place too rigid a restriction on the conduct of war-
fare. In some conflicts, attacking power plants and other basic infrastruc-
ture may be essential to the timely and successful conduct of war. In
dealing with modern industrial states, where power can be shifted easily
from civilian to military needs and where attacks on power stations can
drastically impede an adversary's command and control capabilities, a
blanket prohibition on such attacks might prolong a conflict to the detri-
ment of the civilian population or change the outcome of the conflict alto-
gether. Our purpose in proposing a "compelling military advantage"
standard is to strike a better balance between an unacceptably high level of
protection and what amounts to very little protection of civilians from
harms caused by attacks on infrastructure.
Under our approach, if the advantage of attacking an indispensable
object cannot be viewed as compelling in relation to the anticipated direct
and indirect civilian harm, the military functions served by the indispensa-
ble object may still be thwarted, but must be thwarted by some other
means. For example, if the electricity plant serves command and control,
as well as water-purification, the attacks will need to target the command
and control facilities directly rather than indirectly by way of the facilities'
energy source. Alternatively, our proposed test might be satisfied by a
more limited form of attack, such as the use of weapons designed to dis-
rupt power only temporarily. 5 8
While our suggestion would, if adopted, alter the existing balance
between the protection of civilians and the pursuit of military advantage, it
does not, in its purpose at least, go beyond what seems reasonable to at
least some experts within the U.S. Air Force. Critics of our proposal are
likely to object that it is "unrealistic" to expect that "lucrative" targets that
are central to an adversary's economy as a whole should be intentionally
spared. 59 Writers in the Air Force today, however, are far from lumping
57. Gardam, supra note 16, at 405-06 (arguing that "[o]ne possible solution [is]...
to revise the definition of military objectives so that objects whose destruction will inevi-
tably involve large-scale civilian casualties, a relatively easy calculation to make, are des-
ignated as civilian in nature and thus illegitimate targets").
58. See Crawford, supra note 19, at 113 (noting that "[a]rguably, in the fast-paced,
synchronized environment of twenty-first-century battlespace, the temporary interrup-
tion of electrical power could potentially accomplish a given military objective without
the attendant devastation suffered by Iraq").
59. Reference is frequently made to controversial claims about the effectiveness of
the Combined Bomber Offensive in the Second World War. A careful recent assessment
is in TAmi DAVIS BIDDLE, RHETORIC AND REALITY IN AIR WARFARE: THE EVOLUTION OF BRIT-
ISH AND AMERICAN IDEAS ABOUT STRATEGIC BOMBING, 1914-45, 270-88 (2002). Writing
prior to NATO's bombing of Serbia, Robert A. Pape has argued powerfully that strategic
bombing has never been the decisive factor in any war. See generally ROBERT A. PAPE,
BOMBING TO WIN: AIR POWER AND COERCION IN WAR (1996). For the argument that
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together all civilian targets. For example, United States Air Force Colonel
Charles Dunlap has made a provocative package of suggestions, most of
which we do not accept, but one of which provides an instructive compari-
son with our recommendation. 60
Drawing upon various arguments of others, Col. Dunlap advises: "use
ruinous force not upon people (to even include combatants if possible),
but upon objects" (emphasis in original). 6 1 Col. Dunlap's reference to
avoiding the killing even of combatants when possible reflects his interest-
ing contentions that "citizen soldiers" are non-combatants in uniforms and
that "the American military ethos is largely built on the sanctity of all
human life, combatant and noncombatant alike."'6 2 We have grave doubts
about the suggestion that combatants can be accorded greater protection
without according non-combatants less protection. But Col. Dunlap's pro-
posal for the greater protection of all persons, including combatants, pro-
vides an essential context for his other proposal for the greater destruction
of objects, including many currently classified as civilian objects. Observ-
ing that "American air power today is virtually unstoppable," Col. Dunlap
offers this proposal:
We need a new paradigm when using force against societies with malevolent
propensities. We must hold at risk the very way of life that sustains their
depredations, and we must threaten to destroy the world as they know it if
they persist. This means the air weapon should be unleashed against
entirely new categories of property that current conceptions of LOAC put
off-limits. 6 3
Once again we have serious misgivings, which range beyond our topic
here, concerning both Col. Dunlap's conclusion and the grounds offered
for it.
The element of the package of proposals that we want to focus on,
however, is a sharp limit that Col. Dunlap nevertheless advocates placing
on civilian targets that might be bombed: "What kind of civilian objects
would be added to target lists? None that are genuinely indispensable to the
survival of the noncombatant population" (emphasis in original).6 4 And
from the fullest statement of his suggestion:
Slobodan Milosevic acceded to NATO's demands in June 1999 in part because of his
expectations about unconstrained future bombing if he did not, see STEPHEN T. HOMER,
THE CONFLICT OVER Kosovo: WHY MILOSEVIC DECIDED TO SETTLE WHEN HE DID 91-107
(2001). Hosmer notes, however, that Milosevic was also concerned by a possible future
ground invasion. Id. at 109-14; see also Schmitt, supra note 24, at 174 (noting that
"nearly universal agreement exists among military experts that harm to civilians or civil-
ian property during an international armed conflict is usually counterproductive").
60. Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The End of Innocence: Rethinking Noncombatancy in
the Post-Kosovo Era, 28 STRATEGIC REV. 9, 9-17 (2000).
61. Id. at 14 (emphasis in original). We have come a long way since the erstwhile
"neutron bomb," some of whose critics called it the "capitalist bomb," since it was sup-
posed to kill people without damaging property.
62. CharlesJ. Dunlap,Jr., Kosovo, Casualty Aversion, and the American Military Ethos:
A Perspective, 10 A.F. J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 99 (2000).
63. Dunlap, supra note 60, at 14.
64. Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).
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This proposal does not endorse infrastructure attacks intended solely to
deny the civilian population water, power, and other indispensable necessi-
ties of life because, in addition to ethical and legal concerns, such strikes
can be militarily counter-productive. Whatever tolerance the American pub-
lic may have for the destruction of property, it does not appear to extend to
acts that kill noncombatants, even unintentionally.
65
Col. Dunlap continues by providing his primary reasons and contrast-
ing his position with other positions:
[M]ounting reports of civilian casualties during the Yugoslav conflict paral-
leled a progressive drop in public support for the air campaign. From a
frankly Machiavellian perspective, scenes of enemy noncombatants dying
from the effects of infrastructure loss would undermine the ability of a
democracy to make war.
Additionally, the proposal must not be confused with the kind of indiscrimi-
nate bombing campaign the Russians are reported to have conducted in
Chechnya. There, objects indispensable to noncombatant survival appar-
ently were destroyed .... Nor should it be confused with "bomb them back
to the Stone Age" efforts apocryphally attributed to Vietnam-era strategies.
Both approaches violate the proposal's central principle that calls for dis-
crimination between objects that are indispensable to noncombatants, and
property superfluous to human survival.
6 6
In important respects, Col. Dunlap and we are headed in opposite
directions. Generally speaking, we are advocating that fewer objects be
classified as eligible to be bombed, while Col. Dunlap is advocating that
more objects be eligible for bombing, although he defends this critical
exclusion for indispensable objects. We are primarily concerned about
what makes moral sense, while Dunlap is primarily concerned about what
makes military sense, although several times he contends that "[irom a
moral perspective a change that seeks to replace the killing of people with
the destruction of objects would seem to represent a positive step toward
reducing human suffering in armed conflicts. '6 7 Nevertheless, for all our
differences we agree with Col. Dunlap that it makes neither moral nor mili-
tary sense "to deny the civilian population water, power, and other indis-
pensable necessities of life."
Col. Dunlap hedges his point carefully-the words just quoted are pre-
ceded by the word "solely," which may be a reference to the "for the spe-
cific purpose" language in Article 54 of Protocol I: "this proposal does not
endorse infrastructure attacks intended solely to deny the civilian popula-
tion. . ." The word "solely" leaves an opening for Col. Dunlap to defend
attacks upon dual-use infrastructure that is indispensable for civilians if it
is at the same time highly valuable to the adversary's military efforts,
although the logic of his position, especially his contention that it would
reduce human suffering, seems to require that he would, at the very least,
set the threshold for the destruction of indispensable infrastructure very
65. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). Importantly, Col. Dunlap would thus disallow
destruction that might be allowable on a double-effect moral analysis.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 16.
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high.68 On this key point Col. Dunlap's position, like ours, is more restric-
tive than the current permissive reading of Article 52(2) and the propor-
tionality principle, which sets no effective threshold for military advantage
in the case of any facility with any significant military function besides its
civilian function.
While we start from different premises, it is precisely our goal to cre-
ate a higher threshold for the justification of attacks on infrastructure
indispensable for the survival of the civilian population. Whatever mili-
tary purpose could be accomplished by destroying such infrastructure
ought, in all but exceptional cases, to be accomplished in some other way
compatible with the preservation of minimally adequate conditions for
civilian life. There are many ways to skin a cat: radar can be neutralized
indirectly, perhaps, by destroying all sources of electric power for the entire
country, including power to all hospitals, schools, homes, and sanitation
plants-provided the radar does not have its own separate power source.
But radar can also be neutralized by a direct attack, or if that is not feasible,
by more limited attacks on power sources that help preserve life-saving
surgery, water-purification, and other essential human services requiring
electrical power. We doubt that in practice Col. Dunlap and we would
actually disagree about very many specific cases of indispensable objects,
his hedge allowing a theoretical loophole notwithstanding.
Consequently, we do not believe that our recommendation that the
permissive reading of Article 52(2) and proportionality be replaced by our
selectively protective reading need be unacceptable to military thinkers.
Neither Col. Dunlap nor Major Meyer, for example, expresses any wish to
see indispensable objects attacked even though they strongly favor
expanding the range of civilian objects that could permissibly be attacked
in other respects an expansion that would clearly require revision of the
current LOAC. Although we do not embrace the other expansions recom-
mended by Col. Dunlap and Major Meyer, which we have not explored
here, we believe that the overlap between their views and ours on the point
of protecting indispensable objects is at the very least an indication that
our recommendation is not militarily infeasible. 69
On the other hand, our selectively protective reading, which would
exclude many and perhaps most dual-use facilities that perform indispen-
68. Col. Dunlap already emphasizes the second of the two necessary conditions [in
52(2)] that this Article does not address: not only would the infrastructure need to make
an effective contribution to the adversary's military action but its destruction in the cur-
rent circumstances would need to offer a definite military advantage, in the strict sense,
to one's own side.
69. In this respect, we note that Commander Crawford, a professor of international
law at the Naval War College, advocates incorporation of indirect effects into propor-
tionality calculations, and concludes that "it is neither impractical nor insensitive to
strategic concerns to urge that targeting concepts and the law that governs them keep
pace with technology." Crawford, supra note 19, at 114. We note also that in its early
2003 war plan for Iraq, the United States intended "to limit damage to Iraqi infrastruc-
ture" as much as possible to facilitate post-war efforts at reconstruction. See Eric
Schmitt & Thom Shanker, War Plan Calls for Precision Bombing Wave to Break Iraqi
Army, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2003 at A12.
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sable civilian functions from the range of permissible attack, is an essential
minimum element for any version of the LOAC that is to prevent total war.
Those who sing the praises of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) note
that PGMs have greatly diminished the risk of "collateral damage," because
these weapons are more likely to hit their object of attack. But to the extent
that they are more likely to hit their object, it is all the more important
what their object is. This makes the definition of military objectives and
application of the principle of proportionality supremely important.
If the definition of military objectives and the principle of proportion-
ality are given a permissive rather than a protective reading, then facilities
performing the functions that are most vital to civilian society are fair game
for attack provided that they perform a military function of some conse-
quence. But this permissive reading would fail to protect the minimum
essentials of civilian life. Even those least involved and least threatening to
any adversary-infants, the aged, the wounded, and the ill-could be
deprived of essential services, like the purification of water and the preser-
vation of food, that depend most notably on electricity. We cannot forget
that "it is simply not possible to segregate the electricity that powers a hos-
pital from 'other' electricity in the same lines that powers a biological weap-
ons facility."'70 This is correct: if attacks are to be indirect by way of power
sources, the only choice is between "both." or "neither." We suggest that in
many cases only "neither" provides minimal protection for civilians. The
biological weapons facility may have to be found and attacked directly.
Finding biological weapons facilities is not easy, but the easy way of attack-
ing indirectly, by destroying the power sources for everything, is
indiscriminate.
We began from the understanding that the LOAC must be a compro-
mise between military requirements and civilian needs. We hold to that
position. But any reading of the LOAC that leaves vital necessities for the
most vulnerable and least responsible unprotected is not a compromise, it
is a betrayal. The fundamental requirement that warfare should distin-
guish between combatants and noncombatants by providing minimal pro-
tection for noncombatants is abandoned by such a reading. We do not
believe that this is how the relevant provisions of Protocol I are most rea-
sonably read. The permissive reading that allows destruction of facilities
performing indispensable civilian functions undermines the primary pur-
pose of the Protocol. The selectively protective reading affords a bare mini-
mum of immunity from attack for noncombatants-this is the least that the
LOAC can reasonably be expected to provide.
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